We study the effect of options trading volume on the value of the underlying firm after controlling for other variables that may affect firm value. The volume of options trading might have an effect on firm value because it helps to complete the market (allocational efficiency) and because the options market impounds information faster than the stock market (informational efficiency). We find that firms with more options trading have higher values. This result holds for all sample firms and for the subset of firms with positive options volume. 
Introduction
More than thirty years ago Ross (1976) argued that options written on existing assets can improve market efficiency by permitting an expansion of the contingencies that are covered by traded securities. In the absence of complete markets, simple options are powerful abettors of efficiency in competitive equilibrium. Since Ross' writing, options markets have experienced an exponential growth, both in the number of underlying assets on which options are written, and in the volume of trading.
This paper provides empirical evidence about options activity and the market values of traded companies. Our central arguments revolve around how options affect incentives to trade on private information. If options help to complete the market, agents with information about future contingencies should be able to trade more effectively on their information, thus improving informational efficiency. In addition, informed traders may prefer to trade options rather than stock, because of increased opportunities for leverage (Back, 1992, Biais and Hillion, 1992) .
Supporting the preceding notions, Cao and Wei (2007) find evidence that information asymmetry is greater for options than for the underlying stock, implying that agents with information find the options market a more efficient venue for trading. This finding is bolstered further by Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) and Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) who find that options order flows contain information about the future direction of the underlying stock price. Finally, the analysis of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) indicates that informed traders are more active when volume is greater. These arguments together imply that informational efficiency would be greater in more actively traded options.
In order to link informational efficiency to valuation, we allude to the argument that if prices reveal more information, then resources are allocated more efficiently, which translates to higher firm valuations. A more direct argument is that greater informational efficiency reduces the risk of investing in an asset because market prices reflect information more precisely; which also would tend to make the asset more valuable. It can thus be argued that, ceteris paribus, markets for claims in firms with higher options trading volume should be more informationally efficient and thus valued more highly.
It is worth noting that the mere listing of an option does not necessarily imply a valuation benefit of the type discussed above. If the options market has insufficient volume or liquidity, the incremental valuation benefit from listing would be minor or even immaterial because informed traders see no advantage to trading in options (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988) . Any valuation benefit of options listing should depend on substantial trading activity. To the best of our knowledge, the relation between options trading activity and firm valuation has not been examined previously.
For a large sample of firm during the 10-year period 1996 to 2005 we analyze the effect of options trading volume on firm value after controlling for other variables that may also affect firm value such as firm size, share turnover, return on assets, capital expenditures, leverage and dividend payments. Following other studies (Lang and Stulz, 1992 , Allayannis and Weston, 2001 , and Carter, Rogers, and Simkins, 2006 we use a measure of Tobin's q as the valuation metric.
We find strong evidence that firms with more options trading have higher value. This result is robust to the inclusion of all sample firms, or to the restricted set of firms with positive options volume.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and describes our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the main empirical results, Section 5 presents some robustness checks, and Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review and Economic Hypotheses
Our paper lies at the intersection of the literatures on derivatives pricing, market microstructure, and corporate finance. Black and Scholes (1973) treat options as securities that are redundant and can be replicated in continuous time by investments in stocks and bonds. However, it is well-known that when markets are incomplete, options cannot be replicated by simple securities such as stocks and bonds (see Ross, 1976 , Hakansson, 1982 , and Detemple and Selden, 1991 . Another branch of the literature shows that options cannot be dynamically replicated with stocks and bonds when the stochastic process for the underlying stock involves features such as stochastic discontinuities (see, for example, Naik and Lee, 1990, and Liu, 2003) .
If options are not redundant, then their introduction may allow agents to expand the set of contingencies available through trading and thus may be associated with a positive price effect on the underlying stock. Indeed, Conrad (1989) documents an upward effect on stock prices following an options listing using an event study approach. However, Sorescu (2000) argues that that Conrad's (1989) results are specific to her chosen sample period, and find different results for a more recent sample period. This indicates that there is not yet consensus on the effects of options listing on stock prices.
We contend, however, that the valuation benefit of options should depend on trading activity in options, not merely listing; i.e., there is a link between options volume and informational efficiency. Previous literature, both theoretical and empirical, has argued that options increase the amount of private information conveyed by prices (see Biais and Hillion, 1994 , Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas, 1998 , or Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew, 2004 . Such increases in informational efficiency may occur because informed agents are able to cover more states when options markets are available.
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In the presence of frictions, options may also allow informed agents to obtain leverage more readily.
Option listing does not automatically imply that informed agents can take better advantage of their information. Indeed, as Kyle (1985) points out, agents with private information need to camouflage their trades from other agents to be effective. Do new markets always attract a large number of agents? Pagano (1989) What is the link between informational efficiency and firm valuation? A vast literature examines this question. Fishman and Hagerty (1992) , Khanna, Bradley, and Slezak (1994) , Dow and Gorton (1997) , and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) all conclude that 1 Note that more informed trading affects the costs of liquidity trading. But the valuation effects of such costs are limited because they are a zero sum transfer from liquidity to informed traders. if prices convey more information, corporate resources are allocated more efficiently, and this leads to greater firm valuation. Alternatively, one could also argue that greater informational efficiency reduces the conditional risk of investing in a risky asset (Kyle, 1985) , which would tend to make an asset more valuable.
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All of the preceding arguments imply that options with greater trading activity would be accompanied by higher firm valuations. This hypothesis can be examined empirically.
At the same time, it is worth noting other possible hypotheses. For example, if options lead to increased price uncertainty due to more speculative trading by uninformed agents (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1990 ) then the valuation effect of options could be negative. Our tests may thus be viewed as an effort to distinguish between these competing hypotheses.
Data
We collect data on options trading from Options Metrics. This database includes daily trading volume for each individual put and call option traded on U.S. listed equities. We calculate total annual options volume for each stock in the database and then match these stocks with data from Compustat on Tobin's q as well as a constellation of control variables.
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Tobin's q is computed as the sum of the market capitalization of the firm's common equity, the liquidation value of its preferred stock, and the book value of its debt divided by the book value of the firm's assets. Our control variables are as follows. A proxy for the firm's leverage, long-term debt to total assets, is intended to measure the likelihood of distress. Profitability, measured by return on assets (ROA), is net income divided by the book value of assets. This variable is intended to capture the notion that more profitable firms may have more favorable investment opportunities, leading to higher valuations.
On the other hand, high ROA may also signal that the firm is in a mature phase, and has limited growth opportunities, so that the effect of ROA on q is an empirical issue.
A direct measure of investment opportunities that the firm actually availed of is constructed as capital expenditures divided by sales. Firms that invest more presumably have higher growth opportunities that should translate to a higher q. A dummy variable for whether the firm pays a dividend proxies for capital constraints (firms that pay dividends may have more free cash flow, which may potentially be used to overinvest in marginal projects). All these controls have been used in previous literature, e.g., Allayannis and Weston (2001), Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) . In addition, we include share turnover in the underlying stock to account for any spurious conclusions arising from co-movements in stock and options volume. Table 1 The mean value of return on assets is negative, presumably because small (tech) firms did not perform well during this period. Panel B shows that firms with positive options volume have a higher Tobin's q, both mean and median. Such firms are also larger and more profitable on average than those without options volume. Table 3 Options volume is strongly positively correlated with firm size as well as share turnover.
Tobin's q is negatively related to return on assets, which is counterintuitive, but may be because stocks with high current income are in the "mature" phase of their life-cycle with fewer opportunities for future growth.
As a pre-amble to the main analysis, consider the subsample of firms with positive options volume sorted into deciles by options volume each year. For each decile, we calculate the average value of Tobin's q across all years within our sample. The plot of average q as a function of options volume ranking appears in Figure 1 .
As can be seen, the valuation metric q monotonically increases with options volume, supporting the positive correlation between q and options trading activity documented in Table 3 . In terms of magnitudes, q for the decile with the highest options volume is about 140% higher than that for the lowest options volume decile, and an unreported test indicates that this difference is statistically significant.
The next section tests formally whether options volume has an incremental effect on q after accounting for the effects of controls.
Regression Results
We now examine the determinants of Tobin's q. Since our arguments are cross-sectional in nature, the initial approach is to run year-by-year cross-sectional regressions and then test the significance of the time series mean of the cross-sectional coefficients. But the residuals of the cross-sectional regressions are likely to be serially correlated due to autocorrelation in Tobin's q, so simple t-statistics may be misleading. To overcome this potential problem, t-statistics are corrected according to the procedure of Newey and West (1987) . 4 Results for the full sample of firms and for the subsample with positive options volume are reported in Tables 4 and 5 Share turnover has a positive impact on valuation, consistent with the presence of a liquidity premium in asset prices (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) . Size has a weak but positive impact on Tobin's q. In general, these results are consistent with the rationales for the controls provided in the previous section.
4 As suggested by Newey and West (1994) , the lag-length equals the integer portion of 4(T/100} 2/9
, where T is the number of observations. The coefficient of options volume is positive and significant for both subsamples indicating that options volume has an upward impact on firm valuation. For all firms, the magnitude of the coefficient implies that a one standard deviation move in options volume implies a 16% higher q relative to its mean value. The effect for the subsample of firms with positive options value is much stronger: in this case, a one-standard deviation move in options volume implies a q that is higher relative to its mean by 118%.
Thus, the effect of options trading on firm valuation is both statistically and economically significant.
Robustness Checks
We perform various checks on our results, and in all of these additional tests, the central results are unchanged. Table 6 presents a panel regression that pools the time series and cross-sectional data.
The Parks (1967) procedure is used to control for serial correlation in the error terms.
The results are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 4 and 5 . Thus q is negatively associated with the dividend dummy and leverage, but positively associated with firm size. Options volume continues to be positively and significantly associated with q.
The next issue we consider is endogeneity; specifically, whether high Tobin's q causes increased options trading, rather than the reverse. One could argue, albeit implausibly, that high q firms may attract more attention and this may translate to greater options volume. To address this issue, one needs an instrument for options volume that is inherently unrelated to q. Finding such an instrument is a difficult endeavor and inevitably involves an element of subjectivity.
We propose that options volume may be related to the average absolute moneyness, the relative difference between the stock's market price and the option's strike price. Since the vega of an option is highest at-the-money, agents speculating on volatility would prefer at-the-money options for their greater sensitivity. On the other hand, for someone without volatility information, at-the-money options have the greatest exposure to volatility risk and hence may be eschewed for this reason. Moreover, it could also be the case that informed traders may be attracted to out of the money options because they provide the maximum leverage, but uninformed traders may migrate to in the money options to avoid risky positions.
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The preceding arguments provide a link between absolute moneyness and options volume, but do not specify an unambiguous direction, which remains an empirical issue.
There is no reason, however, that moneyness should be inherently related to q, since exchanges periodically list new options with strike prices close to the recent market price of the underlying stock, so there should be no mechanical link between moneyness and stock prices.
Given the preceding arguments, we calculate the annual average of the daily absolute deviation of the exercise price of each option from the closing price of the underlying stock. 6 We then compute an instrumental variable estimation of the regression in Table   5 , using the average absolute moneyness as an instrument for options volume.
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Estimates of this regression appear in Table 7 . (Note that this regression necessarily uses 5 Pan and Poteshman (2006) document that volume from customers of discount brokers is slightly higher in out of the money options than other ones. 6 For option k on stock j for day t, the absolute deviation is |ln(price j,t /strike k )|. This is averaged over all k and t within a year for each stock j. 7 The even-moneyness variable is positively and significantly related to volume for the overall sample. Paradoxically, this does not necessarily mean that volume tends to be higher in options that are away from the money. It might also be induced if the options exchange lists a larger number of options, with different exercise prices, on firms with more overall options trading. But regardless of the underlying reason, so long as the instrument is well correlated with the explanatory variable (options volume) and does not inherently depend on the dependent variable (Tobin's q), the instrumental variable procedure is wellspecified.
only that subsample for which the options volume is strictly positive because the instrument is undefined when no option is traded.) As can be seen, the coefficient for options volume remains significant in this regression and its magnitude is close to that in Table 5 , suggesting that the main result is not due to reverse causality.
Next, from Table 2 , it may be seen that the distribution of options volume is skewed because the mean is quite different from the median. To address this, we perform a robustness check using the logarithm of options volume (by definition, using only those firms with positive levels of options trading activity). Results from this alternative specification (the analog of Table 5 ) appear in Table 8 . As can be seen, the coefficient of options volume remains positive and strongly significant, while the other coefficients are largely unchanged relative to those in Table 5 .
To obtain a more complete picture of the effect of options trading on valuation, Table 9 reports the year-by-year regression coefficients that are used in computing the averages reported in Table 8 . In every year, the coefficient of options trading is positive and strongly significant. This provides reassurance that the results are not driven by high coefficient magnitudes in one or two years.
We also performed the analog of the panel regression presented in Table 6 (using the Parks (1967) procedure) for the logarithm of options volume, and found the coefficient of options volume to be 0.1328, with a t-statistic of 23.88. The statistical significance of this coefficient is greater than that in Table 6 . Thus, the results are qualitatively unchanged for the logarithmic transformation of options volume.
In other unreported regressions, we have tried alternative specifications by using logarithms of firm size and share turnover; 8 the coefficient of options volume does not change appreciably in these specifications. Using share volume instead of share turnover and scaling options volume by shares outstanding also have little impact on the significance of the options volume coefficient.
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We also included a measure of return volatility (measured by the annual standard deviation of daily returns) in the regression corresponding to Table 7 . The concern is that options trading activity proxies for stock riskiness which could potentially affect q.
However, the return volatility variable was not significant (its t-statistic was 1.32), which
indicates that perhaps some of the other variables, such as leverage, account for the effect of stock riskiness on q. Even in the presence of return volatility, however, the options volume variable remained significant with a coefficient of 0.094 and a t-statistic of 4.75.
Finally, we examined whether options volume proxied for another measure of information production, such as the extent of analyst following. We thus included the number of analysts following a company (from I/B/ES). We did not find the role of analysts to be significant in the analog of Table 5 , whereas options volume remained significant. Details of all of these additional robustness checks are available upon request.
Conclusion
We find reliable evidence that the volume of options trading is associated with higher firm valuations. This result is consistent with the dual notions that more options trading is associated with greater informational efficiency of prices and superior resource allocation.
The key point of our paper is that the degree to which an option is traded, not its mere listing, is associated with higher valuations. Thus, an illiquid option provides no opportunity for informed agents to exploit their information. It would be interesting to consider whether this notion extends to other scenarios. For example, countries such as India have futures contracts on individual stocks, and the effect of such contracts on valuation could be ascertained. In addition, the impact of index options and futures on market valuation seems like a worthwhile exercise. Such issues are left for future research. Table 1 Number of firms with non-missing data.
This table contains the sample size of firms each year. The second column lists the total number of firms with available data for the dependent variable (Tobin's q) and the control variables. The third column lists the number of firms with positive options volume. Firms with no data on options trading activity are assumed to have options volume of zero.
Year All firms

Table 2 Summary statistics
Tobin's q is defined as the market capitalization of common stock plus liquidation value of preferred shares plus book value of long-term debt divided by total assets, Optvol is the annual options volume (in ten thousands of shares), Size is market capitalization (in billions of dollars), Stkturn is the annual share turnover in the underlying stock, ROA is the return on assets defined as net income divided by the book value of assets, CapX is capital expenditures divided by sales, LTD is long-term debt divided by book value of assets, and DivDum is an indicator variable for whether the firm pays a dividend. Table 3 Correlation matrix
Tobin's q is defined as the market capitalization of common stock plus liquidation value of preferred shares plus book value of long-term debt divided by total assets, Optvol is the annual options volume (in ten thousands of shares), Size is market capitalization (in billions of dollars), Stkturn is the annual share turnover in the underlying stock, ROA is the return on assets defined as net income divided by the book value of assets, CapX is capital expenditures divided by sales, LTD is long-term debt divided by book value of assets, and DivDum is an indicator variable for whether the firm pays a dividend. Tobin's q is defined as the market capitalization of common stock plus liquidation value of preferred shares plus book value of long-term debt divided by total assets, Optvol is the annual options volume (in ten thousands of shares), Size is market capitalization (in billions of dollars), Stkturn is the annual share turnover in the underlying stock, ROA is the return on assets defined as net income divided by the book value of assets, CapX is capital expenditures divided by sales, LTD is long-term debt divided by book value of assets, and DivDum is an indicator variable for whether the firm pays a dividend. Tobin's q is defined as the market capitalization of common stock plus liquidation value of preferred shares plus book value of long-term debt divided by total assets, Optvol is the annual options volume (in ten thousands of shares), Size is market capitalization (in billions of dollars), Stkturn is the annual share turnover in the underlying stock, ROA is the return on assets defined as net income divided by the book value of assets, CapX is capital expenditures divided by sales, LTD is long-term debt divided by book value of assets, and DivDum is an indicator variable for whether the firm pays a dividend. Tobin's q is defined as the market capitalization of common stock plus liquidation value of preferred shares plus book value of long-term debt divided by total assets, Optvol is the annual options volume (in ten thousands of shares), Size is market capitalization (in billions of dollars), Stkturn is the annual share turnover in the underlying stock, ROA is the return on assets defined as net income divided by the book value of assets, CapX is capital expenditures divided by sales, LTD is long-term debt divided by book value of assets, and DivDum is an indicator variable for whether the firm pays a dividend. The Parks (1967) procedure is used to account for autocorrelation, using a balanced panel of 2290 firms present in every year of the sample. Table 7 Time-series coefficient averages and Newey-West corrected t-statistics for year-byyear cross-sectional regressions from 1996 through 2005 for Tobin's q as the dependent variable, using only those firms with positive options volume and using annual average absolute moneyness as an instrument for options volume.
Tobin's q is defined as the market capitalization of common stock plus liquidation value of preferred shares plus book value of long-term debt divided by total assets, IV(Optvol) is the instrumental variable estimate of annual options volume (in ten thousands of shares) using the average absolute deviations from even-moneyness as the instrument, Size is market capitalization (in billions of dollars), Stkturn is the annual share turnover in the underlying stock, ROA is the return on assets defined as net income divided by the book value of assets, CapX is capital expenditures divided by sales, LTD is long-term debt divided by book value of assets, and DivDum is an indicator variable for whether the firm pays a dividend. Tobin's q is defined as the market capitalization of common stock plus liquidation value of preferred shares plus book value of long-term debt divided by total assets, Optvol is the annual options volume (in ten thousands of shares), Size is market capitalization (in billions of dollars), Stkturn is the annual share turnover in the underlying stock, ROA is the return on assets defined as net income divided by the book value of assets, CapX is capital expenditures divided by sales, LTD is long-term debt divided by book value of assets, and DivDum is an indicator variable for whether the firm pays a dividend. Table 9 Year-by-year coefficients and t-statistics for annual cross-sectional regressions from 1996 through 2005 for Tobin's q as the dependent variable, using the logarithm of options volume.
Tobin's q is defined as the market capitalization of common stock plus liquidation value of preferred shares plus book value of long-term debt divided by total assets. The explanatory variables are the natural logarithm of optvol, i.e., the annual options volume, Size: market capitalization, Stkturn: the annual share turnover in the underlying stock, ROA: the return on assets defined as net income divided by the book value of assets, CapX: capital expenditures divided by sales, LTD: long-term debt divided by book value of assets, and DivDum, which is an indicator variable for whether the firm pays a dividend. Only the coefficients of ln(options volume) are reported. 
